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THE UNBEARABLE “LITE”NESS OF HISTORY: 
AMERICAN SODOMY LAWS FROM BOWERS TO 
LAWRENCE AND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF 
ANNOUNCING A NEW PAST 
Neil Margolies∗ 
“On the surface, an intelligible lie; underneath, the unintelligible 
truth”1 
Contrary to the most powerful claims of originalist scholars, history is 
not equipped to protect the Constitution from politically motivated 
interpretations.2  This belief, grounded to varying degrees in the idea of an 
ascertainable and objective past, cultivated inside the vacuum of a legal 
community largely unencumbered by the methodological and 
epistemological questions dominant in philosophy and historiography.3  
Martin S. Flaherty’s History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism 
(“History ‘Lite’”)4 partially changed this by introducing methodological 
checks to the anarchistic world of legal history;5 but Flaherty’s important 
work only dealt with half of the problem, acknowledging but not 
addressing history’s implicit epistemological uncertainty.6  This Comment 
 
∗ Associate Schulte Roth & Zabel.  J.D. 2004, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 
Philosophy, University of Maryland at College Park, 2001.  I would like to thank Martin 
Flaherty for his guidance early on, and Sonia Katyal and Charles Kelbley for reading 
various drafts and attempting to steer me in the right direction.  Also I would like to thank 
Sue Margolies, Nancy and Dan Ginsberg, and my father and best editor, Dr. Ronald 
Margolies. 
 1. MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 63 (1984). 
 2. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) 
(“Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system, for it establishes a 
historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge 
himself.”). 
 3. Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 552-57 (1995). 
 4. Id. at 523. 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. Flaherty, supra note 3, at 551 n.122 (“Whether a matter can be deemed historically 
‘true’ in an objective sense need not be resolved to assert the utility of historical 
standards.”); see id. at 551 (“[H]istorians [do not so much] determine what is historically 
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explores this uncertainty and its ramifications through chronicling and 
analyzing the evolution of the legal debate over the meaning of America’s 
sodomy laws over the last seventeen years from Bowers v. Hardwick7 
through Lawrence v. Texas.8  Tracking the arc of this legal-historical debate 
reveals history’s malleability.  As seen in majority and dissenting opinions, 
oppositional historical accounts are grounded in the same set of facts.9  The 
splintering of this one set of facts into two diverging factually supported 
historical accounts exposes legal history’s capacity to shroud an agenda in 
facts.  The different accounts replace the myth of history as an objective 
decisive entity with the reality that history is capable of disguising 
subjective, biased decisions.  Accordingly, this Comment suggests an 
honest and realistic view of history that can immunize our courts from its 
dangers while preserving its unique utility. 
As this Comment explains and defines history through the evolving legal 
debate over the scope and purpose of America’s sodomy laws, it scrutinizes 
and explains this evolution through major works in the field of 
historiography, namely the writings of Martin Flaherty, Raymond Martin, 
Peter Novick, and Hayden White.  As Flaherty explains in History “Lite” 
and I explore in Part II of this Comment, history’s malleability can be 
attributed to the historian.  Accordingly, with the aim of exposing this 
malleability, analysis here is both methodological and epistemological.  
Methodological scrutiny in the manner of History “Lite” is mostly 
relegated to Part I, whereas Parts II and III are concerned with reducing 
history to its essential components—brute facts and the more illusive 
meaning afforded to a set of facts.  Recognition of history’s true 
composition exposes its inherent manipulability. 
Part I, “An Intelligible Lie: The (A)historical Methodology of Bowers v. 
Hardwick,” serves the twofold purpose of introducing the legal debate over 
the history of American sodomy laws, as well as demonstrating history’s 
susceptibility to methodological manipulation by viewing Bowers in the 
context of History “Lite.”  Scrutiny of Bowers through History “Lite”  
reveals a majority opinion supported by a selective reading of the past.  
This section argues that historical manipulations, such as those in Bowers, 
whether intentional or not, in the context of a history-reliant judiciary, 
misinform us about the past and in doing so steer us towards an unintended 
future.  As History “Lite” instructs, however, these errors by historians are 
 
true, but . . . they commonly resolve what is historically convincing.”). 
 7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 9. See infra Parts II-III. 
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correctable.10 
The same cannot be said for the problems arising from history’s inherent 
fact problem.  Part II, “The Unintelligible Truth: Postmodernism and the 
Lawrence Briefs,” addresses the major historical briefs offered to the Court 
in Lawrence as practical examples of Peter Novick’s11 and Hayden 
White’s12 claim that one set of historical “facts” can tell many different 
“truthful” stories.13  Novick’s postmodernist position relies on what Judith 
Lichtenberg describes as “the distinction between a realm of facts (perhaps 
we should say ‘brute-facts’) and a realm of interpretation, which 
encompasses theories, narratives, stories, and generally the larger accounts 
that the historians (or other interpreter of events) set out to tell.”14  Novick 
contends that one set of facts can at a minimum, take on two different 
meanings.15  Hayden White’s The Historical Text as Literary Artifact  
explains precisely how Novick’s ideal manifests itself in historical debates, 
and the Lawrence briefs actualize the ramifications of these abstract 
theories in our courts, revealing two contrasting stories grounded in only 
one set of facts.16  The verification of Novick and White’s abstract theory 
exemplified in the Lawrence briefs plunges legal history into the 
postmodernist abyss, revealing the notion of guidance from an objective 
past as an elusive fiction into factually supported subjective historical 
choices as the reality. 
Part III, “Remains of the Past: The Lawrence Decision’s Impact on 
History and Historiography” reveals Lawrence majority and dissenting 
opinions’ darker ramifications on legal historical fact, before eventually 
attempting to purge legal history from the abyss by discussing the decision 
in the context of Raymond Martin’s Progress in Historical Studies.17  
Marking the death of history as a reliable, objectively decisive entity, the 
historical interpretations of the majority and dissenting opinions offer 
examples of diverging historical opinions grounded in fact held by our 
 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. Peter Novick, The Future of Fact: (The Death of) the Ethics of Historical Practice 
(and Why I Am Not in Mourning), 560 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 28, 39 (1998) 
[hereinafter Novick, The Future of Fact]. 
 12. Hayden White, The Historical Text as Literary Artifact, in HISTORY & THEORY 
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 1, 15-33 (1998). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. Judith Lichtenberg, The Future of Fact, 560 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
43 (1998). 
 15. See generally Novick, The Future of Fact, supra note 11. 
 16. See White, supra note 12, at 15. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
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highest court.  While the ideal of a certain knowable past slips away, this 
section advocates recognition of progress in historical interpretations, as 
well as suggesting a manner in which this recognition can be made.  While 
I consistently argue that history is capable of shrouding an agenda in facts, 
ultimately the argument is not against the usage of history in judicial 
decision making, but instead in support of an honest reappraisal of its 
decisional value; one that maximizes its uniquely illuminating aspects, 
while acknowledging its inherent shortcomings.  In short, ideas about the 
past, by virtue of their malleable nature, are ill-equipped to dictate 
objective decisions, yet they remain uniquely equipped to aid courts in 
reaching just decisions in a manner similar to other subjective entities.  The 
goal here is an honest and realistic examination of what history can, and 
cannot, tell us. 
I.  AN INTELLIGIBLE LIE: THE (A)HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY OF 
BOWERS V. HARDWICK 
When, in 1984, Michael Hardwick challenged the constitutionality of his 
Georgia state law conviction for engaging in sodomy,18 the Supreme Court 
announced that the question turned on “whether the Federal Constitution 
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and 
hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct 
illegal and have done so for a long time.”19  Since fundamental rights are 
decided under a history and tradition analysis,20 this question seemingly 
supplied its own answer with the nebulously phrased conclusion that States 
have enforced these laws “for a long time.”21  Under a history and tradition 
analysis, however, a law that exists “for a long time” can be defeated if it 
no longer carries the meaning it did in the past.22  Whether the sodomy 
laws of yesterday meant the same as the law enforced against Bowers 
should have been the essential question in this landmark sodomy case.  It 
was not. 
Instead, the Court selectively read laws against sodomy in general as 
laws against homosexual sodomy specifically, deeming them constitutional 
 
 18. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 19. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). 
 20. See Oliver G. Hahn, Constitutional and Family Law-Grandparent Visitation in the 
Face of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause: Parental or Grandparental Rights, 
24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 199, 210 (2001).  The history and tradition analysis is a 
prong of the fundamental rights test.  See id. at 211. 
 21. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
 22. Emil A. Kleinhaus, Note, History as Precedent: The Post-Originalist Problem in 
Constitutional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 121, 123. (2000). 
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for no greater reason than their existence alone.23  The first part of this 
section highlights the Court’s flawed methodology in the context of History 
“Lite”’s appraisal of Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash’s The 
Presidents Power to Execute the Law.24  The second part begins the 
deconstruction of history itself, addressing Chief Justice Burger’s 
concurrence as a means to afford meaning to these laws through context. 
A. Bowers “Lite”: How Bad History Became Bad Law and Formed the 
Legal Foundation of the Historical Homosexual Debate 
The Bowers Court decided that the right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy was not “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ such that 
‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if . . . [it] were sacrificed,” and that 
it is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”25  The Court 
upheld the Georgia statute prohibiting sodomy in general, ruling that there 
is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy specifically.26  As 
a history and tradition-based decision, Bowers announced the factual legal 
history of homosexual sodomy laws as it stood in 1986, and would stand 
until Lawrence was decided in 2003.  As such the Bowers decision 
provides the first judicially relevant history of American sodomy laws. 
As will become evident, the backbone of the Bowers decision consisted 
of the same basic brute-facts as the diverging historical accounts in the 
Lawrence briefs; the Court stated that: 1) sodomy was “a criminal offense 
at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen 
States when they ratified the Bill of Rights,”27  2) Thirty-two of the thirty-
seven States had sodomy laws “when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified,” and 3) “until 1961, all fifty states outlawed sodomy, and today 
[1986], twenty-four States and the District of Columbia continue to provide 
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting 
adults.”28  Based on these historical condemnations of sodomy generally, 
the Court concluded that there is no fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy.29  The Court did not explain these laws or place them 
 
 23. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
 24. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Law, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). 
 25. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S 494, 503 
(1977)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 193. 
 29. Id. 
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in any context despite framing the question as to whether a fundamental 
right to engage in homosexual sodomy existed; it seemingly felt that listing 
these laws qualified as a thorough enough historical analysis on which to 
base its decision.  Evidently aware of criticism that would follow, the Court 
attempted to place all blame squarely on the shoulders of history itself early 
in the decision in writing that “[t]his case does not require a judgment on 
whether laws against sodomy between consenting adults in general, or 
between homosexuals in particular, are wise or desirable.”30  In the 
majority’s view, history made this decision, not the Court.  But if history is 
responsible for this decision, then the majority justices are responsible for 
announcing it, just as any historian ultimately must take responsibility for 
the version of the past they endorse. 
With this notion in mind, History “Lite” exposes and attempts to reign 
in the leeway afforded to lawyers and judges working within the anarchistic 
world of legal history.31  In it, Flaherty asserts, “habits of poorly supported 
generalization—which at times fall below even the standards of 
undergraduate history writing—pervade the work of many of the most 
rigorous theorists when they invoke the past to talk about the 
Constitution.”32  Pointing to an example of a work plagued by such habits, 
Flaherty criticizes the historical conclusions in Steven G. Calabresi and 
Saikrishna B. Prakash’s The Presidents Power to Execute the Law.33 
Supported by historical research, Calabresi and Prakash announced that 
the executive branch alone had the power to administrate federal laws.34  
They quote the separation of powers clauses of the Virginia Constitution of 
1776 and the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 to conclude that “‘the 
Executive alone was empowered to execute all laws.’”35  This conclusion 
rests on historical assertions based on these isolated primary sources, yet 
Flaherty’s arguably more thorough analysis of these same sources proves 
the opposite.  Minimally, Flaherty’s work exposes a truth that is as 
mundane to the historian as it is cataclysmic to the novice originalist: that 
two respected scholars can offer different answers to the same historical 
question.  Flaherty’s work, however, is important as more than just 
unintended postmodernist fodder.  It highlights a specific way in which 
lawyers and judges get history wrong. 
 
 30. Id. at 190. 
 31. See Flaherty, supra note 3. 
 32. Id. at 526 (discussing Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 24, at 607). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (quoting Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 24, at 607). 
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In an initial blow to the scholars claim, Flaherty cites Gordon S. Wood’s 
work in differentiating between rhetorical approvals of executive 
supremacy and actualized legislative supremacy, specifically in Virgina.36  
Flaherty writes “the very constitutions [Calabresi and Prakash] single out 
dramatically undercut their claim.”37  Supporting this is the Massachusetts 
Constitution provision “for a ‘council, for advising the governor in the 
executive part of the government.’”38  This advising council made the 
appointments now normally considered within the scope of the executive 
branch.39  In name, the Massachusetts and Virginia supremacy clauses 
seemed to reveal Calabresi and Prakash’s historical understanding of the 
supremacy clause, but consistency in meaning cannot be assumed, and in 
failing to take into account the “wealth of historical scholarship 
demonstrating that most of the state constitutions framed in 1776 and 1777 
gave rhetorical support to the formalistic conception of separation of 
powers . . . but in fact established governments that approached legislative 
supremacy largely at the expense of executive authority,” Calabresi and 
Prakash offered an identifiably incomplete historical account.40  Knowing 
of a law’s existence is a far cry from knowing what the law meant. 
For the same reasons, the laws the Bowers majority cited to deny the 
existence of a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy fall short 
of supporting their interpretation.  While it might be unfair to hold the 
Bowers Court to the standard of today’s historical understandings, it is not 
unreasonable to expect it to be honest to the full breadth of the historical 
debate ongoing at the time.  While the majority exclusively wrote on 
homosexual sodomy, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, pointed out 
that both the Georgia statute41 and several of the laws used to support the 
majority’s historical claim42 pertained to homosexual and heterosexual 
sodomy alike.43  Since the majority ignored the fact that “the Georgia 
statute expresses the traditional view that sodomy is an immoral kind of 
 
 36. Id. at 525 n.14 (citing GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 153-54 (1969)). 
 37. Id. at 525. 
 38. Id. (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. II, sec. 3, arts. I – VII). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
GA. CODE ANN. § 4251 (1861)). 
 42. Id. at 215-16.  “The history of the statutes cited by the majority as proof for the 
proposition that sodomy is not constitutionally protected . . . reveals a prohibition on 
heterosexual, as well as homosexual, sodomy.”  Id. 
 43. Id. at 214-16. 
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conduct regardless of the identity of the persons who engage in it,” the 
Court did not have to ask whether the state may prohibit such conduct, and 
if not, whether the state can save the statute by only prohibiting 
homosexuals from engaging in the conduct.44  Here, an incomplete 
appraisal of the past led to the Court’s loaded legal question. 
Structurally, Calabresi and Pakrash’s omission mirrors that of the 
Bowers Court.  Both presented incomplete pictures of the past by 
representing only part of the doctrine they were relying on.  But, while the 
scholars misapprehension led to a continuing scholarly debate, the Court’s 
error resulted in a misleading constitutional question and analysis.  Bowers 
proved that not only theorists, but also Supreme Court justices, are guilty of 
passing poorly supported generalizations off as historical fact.  But why did 
the Court choose to read these laws selectively, consequently raising the 
question of the fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy?  The 
key to this might be found in Justice Blackmun’s dissent, which is flooded 
with skepticism of the majority’s motivation: 
In its haste to reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the Constitution 
does not “[confer] a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy,” the Court relegates the actual statute being challenged to a 
footnote and ignores the procedural posture of the case before it.  A fair 
reading of the statute and of the complaint clearly reveals that the 
majority has distorted the question this case presents.45 
In writing that the Court “distorted the question,”46 Justice Blackmun 
acknowledged that the law in Georgia regulated both heterosexual and 
homosexual sodomy and as such “the Court’s almost obsessive focus on 
homosexual sodomy activity is particularly hard to justify.”47  Blackmun 
condemned the Court for its focus on only half of the statute in question 
and for painting a deceptively incomplete picture of the past. 
Blackmun’s dissent categorizes the majority’s decision as prejudiced and 
questions their motivation in writing that only “willful blindness could 
obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is ‘a sensitive, key relationship of 
human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the 
development of human personality . . . .’”48  He adds, “[n]o matter how 
uncomfortable a certain group may make the majority of this Court, we 
have held that [mere] public intolerance or animosity cannot 
 
 44. Id. at 216. 
 45. Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice White’s majority opinion). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 205 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)). 
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constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty.”49 
In no uncertain terms, Blackmun accused the majority of 
misrepresenting the question at the heart of this case and its historical 
underpinnings.  It is hard to disagree with him. 
B. Burger’s Bizarre Attempt to Contextualize: An Introduction to 
History’s Brute-Fact Narrative Dichotomy 
In an attempt to explain early sodomy laws further than the majority’s 
string-cite fashion, Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence places them in a 
historical context by defining the “ancient roots” of sodomy laws.  This 
analysis begins with the blanket statement that “[c]ondemnation of 
[homosexual sodomy] . . . is firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian moral and 
ethical standards.”50  This declaration is not cited.  After this he declares 
that “[h]omosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law,”51 
outlawed during the English Reformation, the common law of England, 
and ultimately adopted by the thirteen colonies.52  Burger finally concludes 
that “[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as 
a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”53  
Burger’s curious turn to moral history may have prompted him to add that, 
“[t]his is essentially not a question of personal ‘preferences’ but rather of 
the legislative authority of the State.  I find nothing in the Constitution 
depriving a State of the power to enact the statute challenged here.”54 
Whether moral history is relevant at all is a separate question entirely, 
yet it is one that speaks to motivation of the justices, while simultaneously 
revealing the troubling composition of history.  Clearly, Justice Stevens 
disagrees with its invocation and states that “the fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral 
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; 
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation 
from constitutional attack.”55  Blackmun added, “[t]he legitimacy of 
secular legislation depends . . . on whether the State can advance some 
justification for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine.”56  
 
 49. Id. at 212 (citing O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)). 
 50. Id. at 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 51. Id. (citations omitted). 
 52. Id. at 197. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Perhaps precedent was not Burger’s rationale for citing moral and religious 
history but instead to explain the meanings of these laws in a 
comprehensible context.  In this light, Burger’s concurrence might be more 
sophisticated than it first seems. 
Placing the Bowers majority’s list of laws in the context of Burger’s 
model of moral and religious history seemingly paints a fuller picture of the 
past.  In fact, it seems as if the sodomy laws prove Burger’s claim of 
historical condemnation of homosexuals, while simultaneously proving the 
majority’s cited laws purpose to condemn homosexual activity.  When read 
together they begin to form history in the way we are most familiar: a list 
of events given meaning through context. 
C. Bowers Concluded 
To this day Bowers is the only Supreme Court case to rely solely on 
history in deciding the constitutionality of sodomy laws.  As such, it serves 
as the necessary starting point in analyzing the legal debate over these laws.  
Structurally not much has changed since Burger’s concurrence, and the 
Lawrence briefs and decision all discuss, contextualize, and ultimately spin 
the most basic laws first announced in this case. 
Bowers offers an example of history dissected into its two essential 
components: the brute-facts of the past, in this case the isolated laws, and 
the context in which these facts are placed and consequently afforded 
meaning.  Here, Burger’s concurrence seemingly fleshes out the intent of 
these laws, but in doing so he exposes the brute-fact narrativity 
distinction—the distinction that undermines the ideal of the historical fact, 
and paves the way for the diverging historical accounts dominant in 
Lawrence. 
 
II.  THE UNINTELLIGIBLE TRUTH: POSTMODERNISM AND THE 
LAWRENCE BRIEFS 
When History “Lite” takes legal historians to task for invoking 
incomplete57 or deceptive58 history to support their interpretations of the 
 
 57. See, e.g., Flaherty supra note 3, at 562-63. 
Nowhere is . . . [Epstein’s overbroad] approach more problematic than in Takings.  
To support his sweeping claim about the “dominant . . . Lockean system” of 1787, 
Epstein makes two evidentiary assertions.  First, he argues that Locke’s “theory of 
state”—which presumably includes the  philosopher’s thinking about just 
compensation—was “adopted in Blackstone’s Commentaries.”  Yet Epstein has 
nothing to say about how Blackstone did so, where the Commentaries makes this 
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law, Flaherty raises the bar for acceptability in legal historical scholarship, 
conjuring history’s most valuable implicit component, the scholarly 
monitor.  This monitor is the key to proper historical growth because it 
ensures the evolution of ideas in a forum that is self-policed.59  Under this 
framework historians double as internal affairs agents, weeding out 
unsupported or poorly founded claims in favor of more compelling 
arguments.60  In this respect, history follows a Darwinist evolution and the 
best available information rises to the forefront. 
But, as even Flaherty recognizes, the discussion does not end here.  
Well-policed history forces the best available information to the forefront, 
but the best available information is something very different from the 
truth.  This differentiation prompts Flaherty to note that, “historians [do not 
so much] determine what is historically true, but . . . they commonly 
resolve what is historically convincing.”61  In a footnote he adds that, 
“[w]hether a matter can be deemed historically ‘true’ in an objective sense 
need not be resolved to assert the utility of historical standards.”62  But why 
does he, and scholars such as Raymond Martin, argue passionately on 
behalf of progress in historical understanding while carefully avoiding a 
declaration that history offers airtight empirical facts?  The simple answer 
is that progress in history has not extinguished factually supported 
interpretive divergences.  Additionally, divergent historical interpretations 
have in part led some, most notably Peter Novick, to take the position that 
progress in historical studies has not been made at all; that we have come 
 
adoption clear, or how the commentaries relate to American constitutional thought 
in the 1760’s.  In fact Commentaries’ reliance on Locke, the work’s position on 
takings, and its influence on American constitutionalism are all complex matters 
that fall far short of affording Epstein the simple support he seeks. 
Id. (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent 
Domain 16 (1985)). 
 58. Id. at 558 n.152 (“[O]ne cannot resist the feeling that both Epstein and Dworkin 
eschew undertaking ‘conceptual’ history not only for their stated theoretical reasons, but 
because they assume that history on this level simply will not support their larger 
projects.”). 
 59. Id. at 551. 
 60. See, e.g., James Lindgren, Falling From Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles 
Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195 (2002) (alleging various historical inaccuracies in MICHAEL 
BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN CULTURE (2001)). 
 61. See Flaherty, supra note 3, at 551 (concluding that legal history is relevant despite 
the elusive aspects of truth). 
 62. See id. at 551 n.122.  For a discussion of this Flaherty instructs us to look to PETER 
NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN 
HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988) [hereinafter NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM], as well as 
Thomas L. Haskell’s response in Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practice in 
Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream, 29 HIST. & THEORY 129, 130 (1990). 
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no closer to knowing what truly happened in the past.63  When Flaherty and 
Martin argue that histories can become better through the refinement of the 
scholarly monitor discussed above, and that “better” should be understood 
as more than just being in line with the accepted historical practices of the 
time, but as the next step in a logical progression of understanding, they 
concede that progress does not elevate history to a level of epistemological 
certainty.  Flaherty and Martin accept the inapplicability of conventional 
notions of objective truthfulness or factuality to historical accounts.  
Despite this established uncertainty, originalist judges routinely invoke 
historical interpretations in deciding constitutional issues.64 
In Lawrence, certiorari was granted in part to once again answer whether 
criminal convictions for consensual sodomy violate the Due Process Clause 
of the Constitution, as well as “whether Bowers v. Hardwick should be 
overruled[.]”65  Under the backdrop of Bowers, amici for both sides filed 
briefs necessarily presenting historical accounts supporting their claim, 
splintering one set of brute-facts into two divergent interpretations.  In 
finding oppositional historical meanings grounding the same set of facts, 
these briefs exposed the unsettling reality at the heart of all legal history.  
As exhibited in Bowers, methodological improprieties might be exposed to 
derail an otherwise reliable history.  The malleability exhibited in the 
Lawrence briefs force questions of whether history is an objective tool for 
answering judicial questions or just a facade disguising biased decisions. 
This section begins with a brief examination of the macroscopic 
questions raised when new historical interpretations disprove preexisting 
precedent, as well as the epistemological implications arising when we 
learn more about the past.  Encapsulated within this is an introduction to 
postmodernist historical theory through the writings of Peter Novick.  
Following this, the brute-facts are presented as agreed upon by both sides 
of the debate.  These brute-facts are then structured in the literary forms 
offered by opposing amici, both transferring the past from a list into the 
story form that we normally associate with historical accounts.  The 
arguments by opposing amici comprise nearly identical fact-based 
historical accounts that tell directly opposing stories of the past; naturally 
 
 63. A staunch postmodernist would contend that we never truly know what happened.  
Deeper with this is the epistemological idea that we can never truly know anything.  
Problems also arise concerning the role of objectivity in history.  For this discussion see 
NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM, supra note 62.  Novick himself claims that he is not 
concerned with whether or not there is truth in history, saying he will leave that question to 
the philosophers.  Id. at 4;  see also Haskell, supra note 62. 
 64. Flaherty, supra note 3, at 524. 
 65. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 662 (2003). 
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one side fully supports the petitioners and the other works in favor of the 
respondents.  Hayden White’s theory of “emplotment” explains how 
history’s brute-fact narrativity distinction facilitates diverging factually 
based historical accounts, bridging Novick’s theory with the historical 
accounts offered to the Court in the form of the Lawrence briefs.66  Here, 
the briefs dual purpose is grounding the relevance of White’s theory as well 
as establishing the foundation from which the Justices ultimately could 
have declared the past. 
A. Lawrence and the Ramifications of Readdressing a History-Based 
Judicial Decision 
In their brief on behalf of the Petitioners, Roy T. Englert, Alan 
Untereiner, and Sherri Lynn Wolson asked the Lawrence Court to 
“construe . . . the Due Process Clause with a thorough and nuanced history 
of the subject in mind.”67  This request, arising at least partially from the 
inevitable influx of historical writings appearing in the seventeen years 
subsequent to the Court’s ruling in Bowers, assumes one of two potentially 
overlapping propositions.  Either the Court’s decision relied upon an 
incomplete history, or that the history relied upon in Bowers was just 
wrong, or minimally, was placed in a context that afforded the history a 
misguided meaning. 
Epistemologically, this demand exposes judicially declared historical 
“facts” as relativistic empowered markers of currently prevailing historical 
understanding.  This assertion is incontrovertible, for as time passes, often 
distance can grow between the power of established precedent and the 
value of its historical underpinnings.68  Overtly, the Court takes a 
pragmatic approach in dealing with this and considers new historical 
accounts.  This is contingent, however, on the Court agreeing to rehear an 
issue as “[n]ew historical evidence matters to originalist judges only to the 
extent that they are willing to overturn precedent.”69 
New historical evidence itself implicitly guarantees uncertainty.  The 
history of history demonstrates that interpretations of the past are 
 
 66. White, supra note 12. 
 67. Brief of Professors of History George Chauncey, Nancy F. Cott, John D’Emilio, 
Estelle B. Freedman, Thomas C. Holt, John Howard, Lynn Hunt, Mark D. Jordan, Elizabeth 
Lapovsky Kennedy, and Linda P. Kerber as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Historians]. 
 68. See Kleinhaus, supra note 22, at 124 (writing on “the post-originalist problem, or the 
problem of how Justices committed to an originalist approach deal with historical analysis 
that challenges the historical narrative created in earlier decisions”). 
 69. Id. at 127. 
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constantly replaced with new “better” ones,70 forcing the idea of a 
historically “true” account into doubt; the more we learn about the past the 
more we must admit that we were wrong, simultaneously strengthening our 
belief in the understanding of one historical event while casting greater 
doubt on the idea of knowledge in history overall.  Ultimately, corrective 
historical accounts serve as evidence of a “truth” problem with roots that 
can be traced back to the very nature of historical “facts” and the 
composition of historical accounts. 
Richard Posner writes that there is little problem with “the truth of facts 
that compose a simple narrative or chronology, or even statistical inference 
from historical data, but the truth of causal and evaluative assertions about 
history [are elusive].”71  But those who recognize this dichotomy generally 
do not directly confront history’s “truth” problem.  For instance, Flaherty’s 
assertion presented earlier that “[w]hether a matter can be deemed 
historically ‘true’ in an objective sense need not be resolved to assert the 
utility of historical standards,”72 demonstrates the peculiar regard in which 
“truth” is held concerning historical accounts.  It is the epistemological 
third-rail of legal historical scholarship. 
In The Future of Fact: (The Death of) the Ethics of Historical Practice 
(and Why I Am Not in Mourning) and That Noble Dream, Peter Novick 
argues that “ideals of truth and objectivity[] among professional historians” 
are in decline.73  Whereas, “[i]n earlier times a consensus existed among 
professional historians that the aim of history was ‘to discover and record 
the objective truth about the past’ with the ultimate goal of painting ‘a true 
and complete picture of it . . . ’”74 the “new ways of thinking about 
history . . . [endorse] the inapplicability of the word ‘truth’ to historical 
accounts, the thoroughgoingly and irredeemably ideological nature of 
scholarship, or the impossibility of algorithmic resolutions to conflicts 
between scholarly and other loyalties.”75 
Because he argues that recently “[a]ll historical scholarship, save 
perhaps that small portion devoted to addressing straightforward factual 
matters . . . came to be seen as inherently, thoroughgoingly ideological,”76  
 
 70. See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. 
 71. Richard Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in 
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 594 (2000). 
 72. Flaherty, supra note 3, at 551 n.122. 
 73. Novick, The Future of Fact, supra note 11; see NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM, supra 
note 62. 
 74. Novick, The Future of Fact, supra note 11, at 37-38). 
 75. Novick, The Future of Fact, supra note 11, at 39. 
 76. Id. at 37-38. 
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and because, as the ongoing debate demonstrates, the historical treatment 
of homosexuals is far from a straightforward factual matter, under Novick’s 
framework the conjunctive historical accounts of the historical treatment of 
homosexuals can be seen as inherently ideological.  But what does it mean 
for a history to be ideological?  The answer to this falls back on the 
connection between the history and the historian, and is best explored 
through analysis of the Lawrence briefs through the writings of Hayden 
White offered below. 
As the successor to Bowers, Lawrence v. Texas presented the Court with 
seventeen years worth of new historical studies.  While progress made over 
these seventeen years afforded the Court with a more complete picture of 
America’s historical treatment of homosexual sodomy, it did not transcend 
history’s inherent limitations, namely, it did not solve the “fact” problem 
and eradicate the presence of interpretative divergence.  Further, 
originalism’s presence within the adversarial process highlighted this 
problem, necessitating Lawrence’s refinement of these diverging 
interpretations into two historical tracts:77 the petitioner’s history78 and the 
respondent’s history.79 
B. Diverging Histories and the Lawrence Briefs 
The Lawrence briefs provide an accessible illustration of the malleability 
of history while simultaneously introducing current arguments concerning 
the historical scope of America’s sodomy laws.  To highlight the brute-fact 
narrativity dichotomy, the agreed upon brute-facts consistent on both sides 
of the debate appear here first.  These facts are then separately presented in 
the manner offered to the Court to support the Petitioner and Respondent, 
respectively, actualizing Peter Novick’s claim that one set of historical 
facts can tell at least two very different stories.  In conclusion, Hayden 
White’s The Historical Text as Literary Artifact explains the existence of 
these divergent interpretations in detailing how history’s inherent brute-fact 
 
 77. Because the adversarial system necessitates that two sides are presented for every 
argument, an originalist judicial approach demands that lawyers support their arguments 
with history. 
 78. Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558(2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Cato]; see Brief Amici Curaie of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas Supporting Petitioner, Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter ACLU]; see also Historians, supra 
note 67. 
 79. Brief Amicus Curiae for Respondent of The Center for the Original Intent of the 
Constitution in Support of Respondent, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02- 
102) [hereinafter Original Intent]. 
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narrativity distinction seemingly guarantees conflicting accounts.80 
1. The Brute-Facts of Lawrence v. Texas 
The agreed upon facts serve as only the beginning of the discussion of 
the historical legal treatment of homosexuals and homosexual sodomy.  
Uncontested, these facts are the foundation of briefs and court opinions 
both for and against the constitutionality of the Texas Sodomy Law. 
American prohibitions of sodomy in general date as far back as colonial 
times81 where these early laws were “derived from the English criminal 
laws passed in the first instance by the Reformation Parliament of 1533.”82  
In 1868, the year of the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage, several states 
prohibited some form of same sex intimacy.83  And these prohibitions were 
not toothless, as it is certain that between 1880 and 1995 homosexuals were 
prosecuted for engaging in sodomy.84  Also during this time, however, 
several states began to eliminate their anti-sodomy laws.85  In 1986, when 
Bowers was decided, twenty-five states had anti-sodomy laws.86  At the 
time of the Lawrence decision that number had been “reduced . . . to 13, of 
 
 80. White, supra note 12, at 15.  In this section I present only the foundation of White’s 
argument, as it is most germane to the overall topic of this paper.  At no point in his writing 
does he deviate from the points outlined above.  See generally id.  Throughout his essay and 
his more expansive works he explains that we should apply a more literary minded analysis 
when apprising historical works.  Id.  He believes that divergent histories and histories 
constructed from different perspectives combine to give us a greater overall knowledge of 
the past, albeit one that increases the difficulty of generalizing about what we learn.  Id. 
 81. See ACLU, supra note 78, at 16 (citing CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN 
BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW AND SOCIETY IN CONNECTICUT 1639-1789 (1995) 
(“Colonial law in both New England and the Chesapeake outlawed fornication, adultery, 
and sodomy sometimes with the penalty of death.”), JOHN D. EMILIO & ESTELLA B. 
FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY OF AMERICA 30 (1988), and 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631, 644-45 
(1999)). 
 82. Lawrence v. Texas, 538 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 83. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (noting that in 1868 all but five of 
the thirty-seven states had criminal sodomy laws); Cato, supra note 78, at 9 (citing JOSEPH 
CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 49 (1847), ROBERT DESTY, A 
COMPENDIUM OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 143 (1887), and JOHN MAY, THE LAW OF 
CRIMES §§ 210, 223 (1881) (“In 1868 most state penal codes included the ‘crime against 
nature, committed with mankind or with beast.’ . . . American courts and commentators 
followed the English decisions defining the crime as involving penetration by a male penis 
inside the rectum of an animal, a woman or girl, or another man or boy.”)). 
 84. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569. 
 85. Original Intent, supra note 79, at 25. 
 86. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. 
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which 4 enforce[d] their laws only against homosexual conduct.”87 
2. The Petitioner’s History 
 In anticipation of the Court offering an analysis different from 
Bowers, the ACLU imagines and addresses a history and tradition test with 
concern to “a fundamental right to be free from government regulation of 
consensual sexual conduct in the home.”88  The brief from the Cato 
Institute addresses the questions presented in Bowers.89  The Historian’s 
brief does not offer a legal argument, but instead proposes two historical 
assertions: “[that] (1) no consistent historical practice singles out same-sex 
behavior as ‘sodomy’ subject to proscription, and [that] (2) the government 
policy of classifying and discriminating against certain citizens on the basis 
of their homosexual status is an unprecedented project of the twentieth 
century, which is already being dismantled.”90  All three of these briefs can 
be combined to form the historical argument against viewing American 
sodomy laws as specifically aimed at homosexual activity and 
consequently indicia of a consistent societal disapproval of homosexual 
activity. 
The Cato Institute offers that the 1868 laws discussed in Bowers did not 
use the term sodomy but instead outlawed “crimes against nature.”91  
Under common law the English definition of “crimes against nature” was 
“penetration by a male penis inside the rectum of an animal, a woman or 
girl, or another man or boy.”92  While these laws did outlaw some form of 
homosexual as well as heterosexual activity (even between married 
couples),93 they did not make homosexual or heterosexual oral sex a 
crime.94  For that matter, no “law before the twentieth century” made 
homosexual sodomy a crime.95  The word “homosexual” did not appear in 
the American lexicon until 1892.96  From all of this, the Cato Institute 
concluded that the “regulation of ‘homosexual conduct’ was not the object 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. ACLU, supra note 78, at 11. 
 89. See generally Cato, supra note 78. 
 90. Historians, supra note 78, at 1-2. 
 91. Cato, supra note 78, at 9. 
 92. Id. (citing CHITTY, supra note 83, at 49; DESTY, supra note 83, at 143; MAY, supra 
note 83, at 223). 
 93. Id. at 10. 
 94. Id. at 9-10. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Historians, supra note 78, at 11 (citing JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE INVENTION OF 
HETEROSEXUALITY 10 (1995)). 
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of nineteenth century sodomy laws . . . .”97  Instead they postulate that 
these laws existed primarily for the “protection of children, women, and 
weaker men against sexual assault,”98 and also for the “protection of the 
community against public indecency.”99  To support this, the Institute cites 
a long list of appellate cases in which the defendants were predominantly 
accused of nonconsensual activities.100 
Concerning sexual assault, sodomy laws were considered “crimes 
against the person,”101 and, as such, filled the nonconsensual sexual activity 
“regulatory gap” existent short or rape in 1868.102  Proof offered to support 
that sodomy laws served the primary purpose of regulating nonconsensual 
sexual activity is embodied in the notion that “a man could not be 
convicted of sodomy based upon the testimony of a sexual partner who was 
his ‘accomplice’; conversely, the partner’s testimony was admissible if she 
or he were an unwilling participant or a minor (incapable of giving 
consent).”103  The Cato Institute is so certain of this proposition that they 
write, “[t]his well-established proof requirement created immunity for 
sodomy within the home between consenting adults.”104  Contrary to the 
Bowers findings, in the plainest possible language these historians offer 
that the 1868 sodomy laws had no effect on consensual homosexual 
sodomy. 
With regard to the “protection of the community against public 
indecency,” the 1868 sodomy laws “were typically listed with crimes 
against ‘public morals and decency’—including bigamy and ‘open and 
notorious adultery’; printing or distributing obscene literature; public 
indecency; ‘lewd and vicious cohabitation’ or fornication; blasphemy or 
cursing in public places; and incest.”105  This combined with the idea that 
consensual sodomy within the home was not regulated, must have led the 
Cato Institute to conclude that these laws were only concerned with 
nonconsensual sexual acts and acts done in public. 
 
 97. Cato, supra note 78, at 10. 
 98. Id. at 11. 
 99. Id. at 10. 
 100. Id. at 11. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 11. 
 103. Id. (citing FRANCIS WHARTON, TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 443 (2d ed. 1852); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 512 (8th  ed. 
1880)). 
 104. Id. at 11. 
 105. Id. (quoting Ronald Hamowy, Preventive Medicine and the Criminalization of 
Sexual Immorality in Nineteenth Century America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL 39-41 
(Randy Barnett & John Hagel Ill eds., 1977)). 
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Between 1879 and 1969 sodomy laws changed.  Whereas “[i]n 1880, 
sixty-three prisoners were incarcerated for sodomy in the United States, 
almost all of them people of color and immigrants,”106 “[b]y 1921, 
hundreds of men were being arrested and imprisoned for the crime each 
year,”107 “with a quarter of published sodomy decisions between 1880 and 
1925 involving apparently consensual activities between men, but usually 
in quasi-public places such as restrooms, parks, and bars.”108  In roughly 
this same period the number of states considering oral sex as sodomy grew 
from zero to thirty-one.109  The Cato Institute attributes this change in law 
to several factors, including public displays of indecency by “fairies,” 
preventing molestation, and an overall condemnation of a “‘degenerate’ 
class of people.”110  The change in the laws illustrates the changing regard 
in which homosexuals were held during this period and beyond. 
During the McCarthy era “[s]tate and national governments invested 
significant resources in episodic witch hunts to identify ‘homosexuals’ so 
that they could be arrested and imprisoned, deported or debarred from 
entering the country, discharged from public employment, expelled from 
the armed services, and exposed by that state as ‘sex perverts’ . . . .”111  
Additionally, “[i]n 1953, President Eisenhower issued an executive order 
requiring the discharge of homosexual employees from federal 
employment, civilian or military.”112 
But, the diminishing legal standing of homosexuals began to reverse in 
1969, when: 
“gay people engaged in political activism to remove legal 
discriminations against them[] . . . found allies in the legal profession, 
including the ABA, and the medical profession, which in 1973 resolved 
that homosexuality is not a mental or psychological defect and therefore 
was no basis for unequal treatment.”113 
This reversal materialized when, “[b]etween 1969 and 1976, eighteen states 
 
 106. Id., at 12 (citing JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY 57 (1976)). 
 107. Id. at 12. 
 108. Id. at 13. 
 109. Id. at 12 (citing William Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: 
American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA. L. REV. 1007, 1016-32 
(1997) (covering, in actuality, the years between 1879 and 1923)). 
 110. Id. at 13. 
 111. Id. at 14-15. 
 112. Historians, supra note 78, at 16 (citing JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL 
COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-
1970, at 44 (1983)). 
 113. Cato, supra note 78, at 16. 
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decriminalized consensual sodomy, consistent with the ALI’s Model Penal 
Code . . . .”114  Immediately preceding the Lawrence decision, only three 
states outlawed same-sex consensual sodomy.115  The disappearance of 
these laws coincided with a growing recognition of their original intent, the 
now antiquated disapproval of certain sexual acts regardless of the sex of 
the actor’s partner, and not the disapproval of homosexual acts per se.  As 
such, there is no historical foundation for the approbation of same-sex 
sexual activity. 
3.  The Respondent’s History 
The Petitioner’s historical account is in direct conflict with the one 
offered in the amici brief filed by the Center for The Original Intent of the 
Constitution (“The Center”).116  The Center offers that, “[a]t the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, eight states specifically prohibited 
same-sex sodomy, including five of the original states which retained their 
earlier sodomy laws.”117  And, “[a]t least two more state courts explicitly 
applied the same-sex definition of common law sodomy.”118  But, of the 
combined thirty-one states that prohibited sodomy at that time, all 
implicitly prohibited same-sex sodomy.119  The real differentiation comes 
in the interpretation of these laws. 
Whereas the petitioner’s historians contend that these laws largely did 
not reach into consensual homosexual sodomy, The Center states that the 
history of these sodomy laws do not support the proposition that states did 
not prosecute or condemn same-sex sodomy.120  They support this claim 
with three propositions: 1) the petitioner’s historians relied on appellate law 
for their conclusions and this is not the most accurate portrayal of history, 
mainly because “many convictions are not appealed,”121 2) “the amici 
making this argument, particularly the ACLU, concede that a great 
majority of the reported cases contain factual situations that they deem 
‘unclear,’”122 and 3) “amici’s assertion that societal approbation for 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Cato, supra note 78, at 17. 
 116. Original Intent, supra note 79. 
 117. Id. at 12, 13 n.19. 
 118. Id. at 13 (citing Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147 (1864); Ausman v. Veal, 10 Ind. 355 
(1858)). 
 119. Id. at 14. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 14-15. 
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consensual acts of same-sex sodomy can be found in the silence of the 
appellate records is simply not true.”123 
Concerning the second proposition, The Center writes about the ACLU’s 
conclusion that consensual sodomy was not outlawed because it was 
largely not specifically mentioned in published decisions.  This assertion 
does not acknowledge that acts of sodomy, consensual and private or 
otherwise, were often not described by the Court.  The Center quotes a 
1921 sodomy decision that reads, “The evidence is revolting in detail, and 
it could therefore serve no good purpose to set forth,”124 and an 1881 one 
writing, “Every person of ordinary intelligence understands what the crime 
against nature with a human being is.”125  Beyond this, The Center cites 
three courts that overtly stated privacy was not a factor to be considered.126  
Ultimately, it is The Center’s conclusion that privacy was not a factor 
considered in these cases.127 
In regard to the third proposition, The Center states that “[c]onsent 
provided no immunity in a sodomy prosecution.”128  This proposition is 
overtly supported by court of appeals cases in Texas129 and California,130 
and a case in Iowa.131  The claim that a consenting partner was unable to 
testify in sodomy cases is rebuked by an 1897 Illinois case.132 
Directing itself to the Cato Institute Brief, The Center further discusses 
the implications of immunity for adults privately engaging in consensual 
sodomy.133  The primary argument here is that rules of evidence concerning 
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice bare little significance in a 
discussion of sodomy laws.134  Since these rules spread further than to just 
sodomy cases, “the principle that any action between consenting adults 
within the home was immune from prosecution merely because the 
testimony of one partner was insufficient evidence [is illogical].”135  The 
 
 123. Id. at 16. 
 124. Id. at 15 (citing Smith v. State, 234 S.W. 32, 33 (Ark. 1921)). 
 125. Id. (citing People v. Williams, 59 Cal. 397, 398 (1881)). 
 126. Id. at 15 (citing State v. Gage, 116 N.W. 596 (Iowa 1908); Sweenie v. Nebraska, 80 
N.W. 815 (Neb. 1899); Hutchinson v. State, 24 Tenn. 142 (1844)). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 15-16. 
 129. See id. (discussing Medis v. State, 11 S.W. 112 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889)). 
 130. See id. (discussing People v. Hickey, 41 P. 1027 (Cal. 1895)). 
 131. See id. at 18 (discussing State v. Gage, 116 N.W. 596 (Iowa 1908)). 
 132. See id. at 17-18 (discussing Honselman v. People, 48 N.E. 304 (Ill. 1897)). 
 133. Id. at 19. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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Center accused the Cato Institute of confusing an evidentiary rule with a 
constitutional right.136  This right would have been better proven if any of 
the cases allowed for consent to be used as an affirmative defense or a 
mitigating factor, but none did.137 
From this, The Center concludes that, contrary to the views expressed by 
the petitioner’s historians, the sodomy and crimes against nature laws of, or 
shortly after, 1868 did not allow for consensual and private same-sex 
sodomy.138  Instead, consensual private sodomy was one of the many acts 
directly and clearly prohibited by these laws. 
4.  What We Talk About When We Talk About History: The Lawrence 
Briefs and Hayden White’s Theory of “Emplotment” 
Hayden White explains the existence of these divergent factually 
grounded accounts through his broader argument that one set of historical 
facts can support numerous factually sound stories, demolishing the notion 
of one true historical account.139  This “fact problem,” he argues, is one 
inherent in the literary nature of history.140  White adds nuance to our 
commonsensical ideal of “fact,” differentiating between the type of facts 
we are accustomed to, scientific facts and historical facts, which by virtue 
of their literary grounding, prove more nebulous.141 
White addresses history as consisting of the dual components earlier 
addressed in this Comment: the historical event,142 and the more illusive 
meaning afforded to a historical event or sequence of events.143  
Considering different modes of understanding, White sets out that one way, 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 20 (citing Foster v. State, 1 Ohio C.C. 261 (Cir. Ct. 1886)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See generally White, supra note 12. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. White, supra note 12, at 22; see also Novick, The Future of Fact, supra note 11, at 
37 (for what he similarly categorizes as “brute-facts”). 
 143. White, supra note 12, at 22; see Novick, The Future of Fact, supra note 11, at 37 
(“[T]he words ‘true’ and ‘truthful’ . . . [are] meaningful only when applied to rather 
narrowly defined ‘brute-factual’ statements, singular or statistical.  The words . . . [are] 
adjudged quite meaningless when applied to synthetic historical accounts, whose thoroughly 
constructed, narrativized, emplotted, and, above all, radically selective and perspectival 
character was increasingly emphasized.”); see also Lichtenberg, supra note 14, at 46. 
(“Novick’s account relies . . . [on] the distinction between a realm of facts (perhaps we 
should say ‘brute facts’) and a realm of interpretation, which encompasses theories, 
narratives, stories, and generally the larger accounts that the historian (or other interpreter of 
events) sets out to tell.”). 
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the scientific way, that “make[ing] sense of sets of events”144 is “to 
subsume the events under the causal laws which may have governed their 
concatenation in order to produce the particular configuration that the 
events appear to assume when considered as ‘effects’ of mechanical 
forces.”145  But this style of understanding entails mainly hypothesizing on 
assumptions, as the Court did in Bowers, and Calabresi and Pakrash did in 
The Presidents Power to Execute the Law.146  In the quest for historical 
truth this idea has already been exposed as fallible, but more importantly, it 
begs the question.  Instead, White offers that historian’s often place the 
historical event in “culturally-provided categories, such as metaphysical 
concepts, religious beliefs or story forms.”147  The latter is prevalent here, 
where juxtaposed with brute-fact listings in Bowers, the Lawrence brief’s 
placements of abstract historical events into a story form “familiarize[ed] 
the unfamiliar,”148 or imported meaning where meaning was unclear. 
This analysis results from the basic idea that “[w]e do not live 
stories,”149 yet the history of our collective lives is often told in story form.  
Imbedded within this is the fact that “[n]o given set of casually recorded 
historical events can in itself constitute a story; the most it might offer to 
the historian are story elements.”150  An example of this is, again, the string 
cite style used by the Bowers majority.  In and of themselves the laws cited 
by the Bowers Court merely prove their own existence; but, without 
understanding what the laws meant in context, they tell us close to nothing 
of the historical treatment of homosexual behavior.151  For this reason, 
histories are often presented in story form like fictions. 
Historical events only become components of a comprehensible history 
 
 144. White, supra note 12, at 19. 
 145. Id. at 19-20. 
 146. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Calabresi, supra note 24. 
 147. White, supra note 12, at 20. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 24 (“We do not live stories; even if we give our lives meaning by 
retrospectively casting them in the form of stories.  And so too with nations or whole 
cultures . . . .”) (emphasis in orginal).  But cf. Noel Carroll, Interpretation, History, and 
Narrative, in HIST. & THEORY: CONTEMPORARY READINGS, 35, 40 (Brian Fay ed., 1998) 
(“This [argument] is not compelling comprehensively.  For it is often the case that we 
planif not out entire lives, at least important episodes thereinby means of telling or 
visualizing stories to ourselves, and, then, we go about enacting them . . . .”). 
 150. White, supra note 12, at 18. 
 151. The danger exists of superimposing our own current beliefs and understandings in 
interpreting the past.  It is uncertain what the term sodomy itself specifically entailed at this 
time, and it should be noted that the term homosexual was not part of the English language 
at the time that these laws came into existence.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., GAYLAW: 
CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 160 (1999). 
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through what White calls “emplotment,” or “the encodation of the facts 
contained in the chronicle as components of specific kinds of plot 
structures, in precisely the way . . . that is the case with ‘fictions’ in 
general.”152  Put more simply, “emplotment” is the “contextualization” of 
historical events in a literary framework; the addition of a plot to a series of 
events.  It is only when historical events are “emplotted” that they begin to 
form histories in the literary and comprehensible form; we only begin to 
understand the past when we convert a list of events into a story of and 
about those events.  This is exemplified by the Lawrence briefs, where the 
Petitioners provided meaning to their brute-facts through placement in the 
story of policy concerns signaling the dormant then rising animus towards 
homosexuals and its eventual retreat.  The Respondents, on the other hand, 
told the story of a consistent disapproval of homosexuality.  In both 
instances, roughly the same set of brute-facts were “emplotted” to explain 
the scope and aim of these laws.  Each brief thus comprises a historical 
account of America’s treatment of homosexual activity in a manner more 
intelligible and comprehensive than the Court had seen before.  Of course, 
this also meant that the idea of one true past slipped further away. 
Under White’s understanding, historical events are value-neutral153 and 
only become “tragic, comic, romantic or ironic . . . upon the historian’s 
decision to configure them according to the imperatives of one plot 
structure or mythos rather than another.”154  But also under this 
understanding, historical events—or brute-facts—can be manipulated to 
tell any story, or minimally two stories, such as the two divergent stories 
presented to the Court.  As Peter Novick explains, “with minimal ingenuity 
you can construct a narrative of almost any imaginable shape, drawing 
whatever moral you wish, without getting facts wrong.”155  The 
 
 152. White, supra note 12, at 17. 
 153. White, supra note 12, at 18.  White chooses his words carefully in concern to 
emplotments that seem counterintuitive.  He calls “the emplotment of the life of President 
Kennedy as comedy,”—which no one would accept—as a “misfire,” as opposed to being 
flat-out wrong.  Id.  Here again, it is the scholarly monitor’s role to police internally.  
Beyond recognizing this “misfire,” historian’s are free to choose among emplotting 
President Kennedy’s life either “romantically, tragically, or satirically,” with little 
complaint. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Novick, The Future of Fact, supra note 11, at 40.  But cf. Lichtenberg, supra note 
14, at 47 (“[N]ot every interpretation is compatible with every set of facts, and some 
interpretations better fit a given set of facts than others.”).  Lichtenberg rebuts the notion of 
“the historian’s decision to configure” historical events in a specific story form, potentially 
rebutting the notion of a Justices’ choice to adopt a favorable historical interpretation.  Id.  
Even if she is correct, then the decision to accept the “better” history will remain in the 
hands of the Court.  This choice puts ill-equipped Justices into the position of ultimate 
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implications of this are potentially damning for judges relying on the past, 
particularly originalists.  If historical events lend themselves to any story, 
then within the confines of the judicial system both sides of a constitutional 
debate will always ground their opinions in historical facts, and history-
based decisions will be no less reliant on the subjective choice of judges as 
the feared living constitution.  It is clear that the Lawrence Court at least 
had the option of accepting either of these histories and announcing the law 
it supports under the facade of objectivity. 
“The important point is that most historical sequences can be emplotted 
in a number of different ways, so as to provide different interpretations of 
those events and to endow them with different meanings.”156  White makes 
it clear that narrativity reaches beyond the mode of storytelling and into the 
meaning of the story that is told.  This idea, based on the distinction 
between a historical event and its more illusive meaning, is exposed in the 
Lawrence briefs, where the same set of facts simultaneously supported two 
directly contrasting conclusions. 
5. Lawrence Briefs Concluded 
While Lawrence’s brute-facts tell us little more than that sodomy laws 
existed in our past and, prior to its ruling, in our present, they do not tell us 
at whom these laws were aimed and how they were enforced, and as such 
they do not fully comprise a history applicable for judicial decision 
making; brute-facts necessarily only represent half of a historical account.  
It is only when these facts become fleshed-out, contextually placed, and 
ultimately “emplotted” that they begin to take the form of legally 
applicable history.  But it is also in this process when incompleteness, 
omissions, errors, and subjective bias inescapably find their way into 
historical accounts.  Here, the disparity in the historical conclusions arrived 
at under this one set of agreed upon facts concerning the aim and scope of 
early sodomy laws, can be partially attributed to the more specific sources 
cited by the separate sides in this debate.  But this becomes a “chicken or 
the egg” problem with regards to the opinions these historians had before 
they began constructing their histories. 
The adversarial system necessitates that two sides are taken in every case 
that potentially relies on history; objectivity is not expected.  It is ultimately 
 
historian, requiring a level of objectivity that history might not afford.  As Posner has 
written, “[l]egal professionals are not competent to umpire historical disputes.”  Posner, 
supra note 71, at 595.  Even if events lend themselves to specific emplotments, it will still 
not diminish history’s possibility of grounding a subjective decision in reliance on the past. 
 156. White, supra note 12, at 18. 
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the court’s decision whether to accept a set of brute-facts and then combine 
them with an offered “emplotment” at a level of certainty deserving of the 
title “historical fact” and incontrovertible enough to dictate constitutional 
jurisprudencein effect announcing the factual past as the historian of 
record.  Of course, this role of historian-mediator requires objectivity.  On 
the meta-level Peter Novick should once again be considered in deciding 
whether a judge serving as the ultimate historian can be objectiveit is 
clear he feels that a judge, or anyone for that matter, cannot.157  But he is 
not alone in doubting the rule of judge as historical arbiter.  Richard Posner 
proposes that “when there is not . . . [consensus among professional 
historians,] the judges must find a method other than history of resolving 
whatever legal dispute the history has been brought to bear upon.”158  
Posner’s perspective exemplifies the growing recognition among legal 
scholars of the impact of Novick and White, for “[t]he return of literature 
plunged historical studies into an extended epistemological crises,”159 and 
this crisis has not escaped our courts. 
III.  REMAINS OF THE PAST: THE LAWRENCE DECISION’S IMPACT ON 
HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
“To ignore the truth inside the lie is to sin against the craft . . . .”160 
White and Novick define history with a level of malleability rendering it 
nearly inapplicable for legal decision-making.  For if it is true “that most 
historical sequences can be emplotted in a number of different ways, so as 
to provide different interpretations of those events and to endow them with 
different meanings,”161 then how can a court discern one correct 
understanding of the past?  The Lawrence Court came close to announcing 
one of their own, and while falling short of solely basing its decision on 
history, it made historical assertions changing the current legal conception 
of the historical treatment of homosexuality.  Concurrently, in a dissenting 
opinion authored by Justice Scalia, historical assertions similar to those 
first proposed in Bowers were also embraced by justices of the Court. 
In an effort to purge legal history from the postmodernist wasteland, and 
delineate its benefits along with its shortcomings, both of these historical 
 
 157. See generally NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM, supra note 62. 
 158. Posner, supra note 71, at 595. 
 159. DAVID HARLAN, THE DEGRADATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (1997). 
 160. Stephen King, Acceptance Speech at the 2003 National Book Awards, available at 
http://www.nationalbook.org/nbaacceptspeech_sking.html.  There is some scholarly slight-
of-hand here, as this statement was made in regard to fiction writing. 
 161. White, supra note 12, at 18. 
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accounts are presented and then analyzed under Raymond Martin’s 
Progress in Historical Studies,162 which argues for recognizing progress in 
historical understanding despite the illusiveness of a factual past.  Martin’s 
theoretical argument, matched with the dueling histories of Lawrence, 
expose the unique benefit of historical studies as experienced by the 
historian, but ultimately fall short of supplying a justification for legal 
invocations of historical accounts as solely decisive entities.  Instead, in 
conclusion, this Comment proposes history’s rightful application is an aid 
towards achieving justice, and not as an empowered disguise used to 
circumvent it. 
A. The Lawrence Decision 
Where the Bowers Court framed the question on the existence of a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, the Lawrence Court 
concluded that the case “should be resolved by determining whether the 
petitioners were free as adults to engage in private conduct in the exercise 
of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution.”163  To this end the Court deemed it necessary to 
“reconsider the Court’s holding in Bowers.”164 
The Court invoked Griswold v. Connecticut,165 which protected a 
married couple’s “right to make certain decisions regarding sexual 
conduct”  as a privacy issue under the Due Process Clause, and its progeny 
to outline the Fourteenth Amendment’s privacy protection as covering 
consensual sodomy.166  Eisenstadt v. Baird167 affirmed the unmarried 
individual’s similar right to privacy,168 and Roe v. Wade169 and Carey v. 
Population Services International170 supported this affirmation.171  Because 
the right examined in Lawrence was much more general than that of 
Bowers, the case did not turn on a reexamination of the Bowers history, but 
instead on the scope of the ahistorical right to privacy.  Still, in perhaps a 
forward thinking move, the history proposed in Bowers was refuted by the 
 
 162. Raymond Martin, Progress in Historical Studies, 37 HIST. & THEORY 14 (1998) 
[hereinafter Martin, Progress in Historical Studies]. 
 163. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 2477. 
 167. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 168. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453). 
 169. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 170. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 171. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565. 
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majority and supported by the dissenting justices. 
1. The Majority’s History 
The Lawrence Court ultimately framed the question as to “whether the 
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the 
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.”172  While the decision withdrew support 
for the historical facts declared in Bowers,173 the Court stopped short of 
declaring a new judicially binding history of American sodomy laws.  The 
majority noted that it “need not enter this debate in the attempt to reach a 
definitive historical judgment.”174  Still, the Court offered its disapproval of 
the history presented in Bowers and embraced several of the Petitioner’s 
historical assertions in its dicta. 
As an initial matter, the Court wrote, “there is no longstanding history in 
this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.”175  
The Court notes, rather weakly, that this “may be explained in part by 
noting that according to some scholars the concept of the homosexual as a 
distinct category of person did not emerge until the late nineteenth 
century.”176  Relying on nineteenth-century commentators, and in full 
agreement with both sides of this debate, the Court embraced the idea that 
American sodomy laws punished sodomy between men and men and 
between men and women.177  The Court then adopted the petitioners 
historical interpretation that, “[l]aws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to 
have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private.”178  Note 
that the Court chose to include the word “seem,” implicitly admitting the 
difficulty in declaring historical fact by carefully wording this statement as 
a disavowal of a previously accepted historical fact, and not a declaration 
of a new belief.  To support the notion of non-prosecution of consensual 
acts, the Court relies on the petitioner’s idea that “one purpose for the 
prohibitions was to ensure there would be no lack of coverage if a predator 
committed a sexual assault that did not constitute rape as defined by the 
 
 172. Id. at 563. 
 173. Id. at 567 (“[T]he following considerations counsel against adopting the definitive 
conclusions upon which Bowers placed such reliance.”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 567-68. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 569. 
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criminal law.”179  From this they offer that sodomy prosecutions typically 
were brought against adults either using force or engaging in relations with 
minors and not against adults engaging in consensual sodomy.180 
The Court then addresses the idea that “[u]nder then-prevailing 
standards a man could not be convicted of sodomy based upon testimony of 
a consenting partner, because the partner was considered an 
accomplice,”181 offering only that this proves the infrequency of 
prosecutions.  The Court acknowledges that early legal literature might not 
have included descriptions of homosexual behavior because of the private 
nature of the acts.182  The Court gives in to the notion that “there may have 
been periods in which there was public criticism of homosexuals as such 
and an insistence that the criminal laws be enforced to discourage their 
practices.”183  But this, it contends, did not arise until “the last third of the 
twentieth century,”184 as “[i]t was not until the 1970’s that any State 
singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine 
States have done so.”185 
2. The Dissenters’ History 
While the majority mostly adopted the historical account presented in 
the briefs on behalf of the petitioners, Justice’s Scalia, Rehnquist, and 
Thomas (“Dissenters”) unsurprisingly adopted a historical account closer to 
that proposed by the respondents, nearly mirroring the Bowers decision 
both substantively and rhetorically.  Where the majority relied on the 
assertion that “there is no longstanding history in this country of laws 
directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter”186 to support their 
historical reconstruction, the Dissenters claim this fact only reaffirms their 
revisionist interpretation of the basis of Bowers decision: “that our Nation 
has a longstanding history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general—
regardless of whether it was performed by same-sex or opposite-sex 
couples . . . .”187 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 595 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 595.  This might be a generous reading of Bowers, where the majority’s 
decision was actually criticized by dissenting justices for not considering these laws as 
prohibitions of sodomy generally, but instead reading them only for their prohibitions of 
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The Dissenters then dispute the validity and weight of the majority’s 
notion that “laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced 
against consenting adults acting in private.”188  First noting that this 
proposition is offered without citation,189 the dissent then questions the 
meaning of the statement.  Scalia, writing for the dissent, notes: 
I do not know what “acting in private” means; surely consensual sodomy, 
like heterosexual intercourse, is rarely performed on stage.  If all the 
Court means by “acting in private” is “on private premises, with the doors 
closed and windows covered,” it is entirely unsurprising that evidence of 
enforcement would be hard to come by.190 
Contrasting the majority’s claim that early laws were not targeted at 
consensual same-sex partners, the Dissenters cite the “203 prosecutions for 
consensual, adult homosexual sodomy reported in the West reporting 
system and official state reporters from the years 1880-1995,”191 as well as 
“records of 20 sodomy prosecutions and 4 executions during the colonial 
period.”192  Concerning “‘the past half of the century[,] . . . there have been 
134 reported cases involving prosecutions for consensual, adult 
homosexual sodomy.”193  And, concerning the American Law Institute’s 
1955 recommendation not to criminalize “consensual sexual relations 
conducted in private,” the Dissenters point out that “the Court ignores the 
fact that this recommendation was ‘a point of resistance in most of the 
states that considered adopting the Model Penal Code.’”194 
Scalia considers the majority decision as “the product of a Court, which 
is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the 
so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by 
some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium 
that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.”195  Further 
channeling Bowers rhetoric, he adds, “Let me be clear that I have nothing 
against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda through 
normal democratic means.”196  Thomas, appearing more overtly 
 
same-sex sodomy. 
 188. Id. at 596. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 601. 
 196. Id. at 602. 
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diplomatic, adds that the law in question is “‘uncommonly silly,’”197 and 
that “[i]f I were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to repeal 
it.”198 
3. Lawrence Concluded 
The histories presented in Lawrence continued the discussion that began 
in Bowers seventeen years prior, beginning with contentions over the 
relevancy of the scope of early sodomy laws.  Taking a cue from the 
Bowers dissenters, the Lawrence majority denied the historical foundation 
of laws directly aimed at homosexual sodomy.199  In Bowers, as outlined 
earlier, a long list of early sodomy laws supported the notion of a historical 
condemnation of homosexual sodomy.200  The Bowers majority simply 
never mentioned that these laws forbid sodomy generally.201  Yet, 
interestingly the Dissenters in Lawrence speak about the “longstanding 
history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general” as the basis of the majority 
decision in Bowers,202 and consequently encompassing the more specific 
condemnation of same-sex sodomy at issue.  This argument, while 
persuasive on the surface, is clearly a revisionist look at Bowers through a 
more modern historical and sociological lens; Bowers only overtly focused 
the historical treatment of same-sex sodomy.  In the seventeen intervening 
years, the desire to view these laws in totality has shifted; where they 
originally were invoked to expose the selectivity of the Bowers majority, 
now they were being used to hide the selectivity of the Bowers majority. 
The Lawrence Dissenters sought to repudiate some of the majority’s new 
historical claims.  Where the majority adopts the petitioner’s syllogism and 
eventual inference that consensual same-sex sodomy was left largely 
unregulated,203 the Dissenters cite a string of convictions to support the 
contrary.204  These convictions do not appear in the majority’s historical 
analysis. 
Overall, neither account, taken on its own, tells the full story of these 
sodomy laws and their enforcement.  Both have their flaws, most notably 
 
 197. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
527 (1965)). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). 
 201. See id. 
 202. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596. 
 203. Id. at 568. 
 204. See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text. 
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that they cannot simultaneously be true.  Yet, together and also combined 
with the differing briefs, they take on the rough form of an understanding 
of the past that is more thorough, complete, inclusive, and factual than any 
history of this sort that courts have seen before.  Somehow, Lawrence has 
made it harder to say what we specifically now know about the history of 
these sodomy laws, while simultaneously fostering the belief that today we 
somehow know more about these laws in general.  This dualistic 
recognition illuminates the true value of constructing histories, but it also 
highlights their indirect applicability for our courts. 
 
B. Shifting the Paradigm: New Ways to Appraise and Apply Our Past 
 
The uncertainty of historical assertions has not been lost on legal 
scholars.  In concern to originalism and constitutional history, Jack N. 
Rakove writes that “the ideal of ‘unbiased’ history remains an elusive goal, 
while the notion that the Constitution had some fixed and well-known 
meaning at the moment of its adoption dissolves into a mirage.”205  But he 
adds that, “in the end, what is most remarkable about our knowledge of the 
adoption of the Constitution is not how little we understand but how 
much.”206  In acknowledging the valid questions raised by 
epistemologists207 while continuing to construct histories as a historian, not 
a lawyer,208 Rakove proves that recognizing the myth of historical fact does 
not mark the death of the legal historian.  In fact, it liberates the historian to 
pursue the past both honestly and subjectively. 
Just as recognizing history’s limitations does not prevent the historian 
from constructing histories, it similarly should not defeat history’s 
relevance in judicial decision making.  Instead, acknowledgment of 
history’s malleability should only supply courts with a new set of 
guidelines and obligations, both in the form of a new framework in which 
to view history and historical progress, and a new manner in which it 
 
 205. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 6 (1996). 
 206. Id. at 6-7. 
 207. Id. at 158 (“Set against the epistemological writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, or 
Kant, Madison’s brief reflections are hardly noteworthy; their significance instead rests in 
the contrast they reveal between his understanding of the problem of constitutional 
interpretation and the more rigid mode of political thinking he imputed to the Anti-
Federalists.”). 
 208. Id. at 10. 
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should be applied. 
1. Appraising the Past 
In Progress, an answer to Peter Novick, Martin looks to answer two 
questions: 1) “What would it take for us now to have more understanding 
of the past,”209 and 2) “whether there has been progress in historical 
studies.”210  He explains progress as the idea “that we now understand the 
past better.”211  Martin, like Rakove, does not fight the postmodernists at 
their own battle212—he does not look to prove that we can find historical 
facts—but instead he salvages history’s worth through delineating the 
guidelines for recognizing progress in a historical debate.  This notion of 
progress serves as a surrogate for the previously desired ideal of truth in 
history.  Progress in historical understanding is the best we can ask for as 
we constantly work towards a better understanding of the past, and 
recognizing this can be of value to our courts. 
Contrary to Novick, Martin says that, “in virtually every major, long-
standing, interpretational controversy in historical studies there has been 
significant progress: we not only know more now, we understand 
better.”213  He outlines this argument through a historiography of the 
American Revolution, pointing out that the Imperialist histories were 
improvements upon the previous Whig interpretations.214  In comparing the 
two, Martin notes that the primary advancements propagated by the 
Imperialists were that 
they were based on a more sophisticated evaluation of evidence; they 
counterbalanced Whig overemphasis on ideology and diplomatic 
developments by calling attention to underlying social and economic 
realities; they were less metaphysically speculative; they were more 
impartial; and—the clincher—they afforded students of the Revolution an 
opportunity to view it not only from the perspective of the 
Revolutionaries but also from that of British administrators.215 
 
 209. Martin, Progress in Historical Studies, supra note 162, at 14. 
 210. Id. at 15. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 17. 
 215. Id. at 19.  This analysis, followed by the introduction of the Progressives, Neo-
Whigs, and Neo-Progressives outlines Darwinist history through self-policing.  It also 
demonstrates an underlying theme of consistencies that later becomes important for 
Martin’s argument. 
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Martin adds to this the contributions by the Progressives,216 the Neo-
Whigs217 and Neo-Progressives,218 and social historians.219  Through these 
competing interpretations he concludes that the history of the Revolution 
“has become more accurate, more comprehensive, better balanced, and 
better justified . . . .”220  In totality the same can be said for the history of 
American sodomy laws.  Applying Martin’s analysis to that history 
solidifies the nebulous feeling of “knowing more” addressed earlier, and 
outlines an appreciation for history that exists independent of questions 
about its ability to tell the truth. 
a. Marking Historical Accuracy, Comprehensiveness, and Balance. 
By Martin’s account histories become more accurate when: 
many factual and explanatory mistakes in previous interpretations have 
been corrected and the corrections tend[] to be cumulative; more 
comprehensive and better balanced because more sorts of causal 
influences have been taken into account, more sorts of subjective 
perspectives of the people whose history is being more interpreted have 
been portrayed, interpretive structures have become more accommodating 
 
 216. Id. at 21.  Martin writes: 
Did the Progressive interpretations contribute to progress?  Surely they did, for at 
least three reasons: first, in important respects the Progressives took a more 
discriminating view of colonial life than had earlier historians and thus corrected 
for a number of imbalances and oversights; second, they highlighted the 
importance of considering self interest as a motivating force; and, third, they 
introduced the illuminating idea that even apart from considerations of self-
interest, reasons should not simply be taken at face value since they may express a 
more explanatory underlying reality. 
Id.  He adds that, “the progressives went astray by modeling their interpretations of the 
American Revolution too closely on then extant interpretations of the French Revolution.” 
Id. 
 217. Id. at 22 (“Neo-Whigs, including Robert Brown, Forrest McDonald, and Daniel 
Boorstin, had become dissatisfied with the ‘deterministic interpretations’ of the 
Progressives, claiming that the progressives had exaggerated the rigidity of class divisions 
in colonial America and also the oppression and exclusion from politics of the lower 
classes.”). 
 218. Id. at 26 (“[W]hereas [Bernard] Bailyn and [Edmund] Morgan had suggested that 
among free whites, poverty was unknown in colonial America and hence that ‘social strains’ 
generated by poverty were not among the causes of the Revolution, Gary Nash claimed to 
have found in tax, poor relief and probate records, abundant evidence of poverty in colonial 
times.”).  Martin feels that the label of “Neo-Progressives” might be misleading.  Id. 
 219. Id. at 25 (“Not a school of interpretation but a social science-oriented approach to 
previously ignored data, social history has dislocated much of what historians . . . have 
produced, much of it about people—the poor, woman, slaves and natives—whom historians 
previously had neglected.”). 
 220. Id. at 27. 
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and inclusive; and interpretations have tended to become less 
partisan . . . .221 
Because the Bowers Court was only concerned with whether the laws of 
and around 1868 prohibited homosexual sodomy (this specific inquiry is 
attributable to the specific question the Court asked), it was not forced to 
comprehend these laws in their entirety.  Whereas Burger explicated the 
purpose of these laws through insinuatingly contextualizing their existence 
with historical, moral, and religious condemnation of homosexuality, the 
briefs on behalf of the Petitioner as well as the Lawrence majority offer a 
more pragmatic grounding in the form of preventing forms of 
nonconsensual sexual abuse not then defined as rape,222 as well as 
preventing public crimes against “morals and decency.”223  It is argued, 
that the laws were not concerned with private acts.  Whether this is a 
correction is not entirely clear.  Burger more insinuated then asserted the 
intent of these laws, and while the Petitioners offer a fuller picture of their 
roots, they do not (nor have they set out to) entirely undermine the 
assertion that these laws have some religious grounding. 
When Martin writes of improved accuracy, he is speaking more directly 
to the replacement of brute-facts.  That has not been done in the seventeen 
intervening years between Bowers and Lawrence.  The Petitioner’s 
pragmatic argument, however, certainly improves our understanding by 
affording a more comprehensive look at the past, as well as offering a 
different perspective.  This is further explicated in the Neitzchian-style 
analysis found below. 
b. Justified History 
History becomes “better justified because the sheer quantity of evidence 
on which interpretations are based has grown enormously, and more careful 
and sophisticated methods for assessing evidence have been introduced.”224 
Comparisons of the histories discussed in Bowers and eventually in 
Lawrence expose much growth in interpretational evidence.  While Bowers 
and Lawrence concern the same issuethe sophistication and content of 
the historical accounts offered to the Court in Lawrence greatly surpass the 
Bowers interpretationadmittedly most of the changes can be found in the 
petitioner’s accounts.  The advances made by the petitioner’s force a 
 
 221. Id. at  27-28. 
 222. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 224. Martin, Progress in Historical Studies, supra note 162, at 28. 
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reexamination of what we thought we knew.  One need not adopt any of the 
petitioner’s conclusions to acknowledge that they have minimally offered 
factually grounded advancements forever changing the scope and focus of 
the debate.  This becomes further apparent as the respondent’s history reads 
just as much as a reaction to that of the petitioner’s as it does a 
comprehensive telling of the past.  Interestingly, the scope of primary 
brute-facts open for interpretation has barely changed at all; now we are 
simply learning more about them. 
The “more careful and sophisticated methods for assessing evidence” 
can best be tied to the methodological assertions made by Flaherty and the 
more general idea of the scholarly monitor.  It is the obligation of historians 
on opposing sides of this debate to catch their opponent’s deceptive or 
incomplete histories, but these are not always easy to find.  If Flaherty’s 
assertions in History “Lite” are correct, then the legal world still needs 
quite a bit of refinement in this category.  Still, scholarly scrutiny of 
Bowers has led to criticism and disapproval of the history the Court first 
supported.  Now, the Lawrence case and briefs read together should form a 
series of responses in a debate, and not two concurrent truthful historical 
tracts.  They work off of each other to support or destroy claims and 
ultimately for a more complete picture of our past. 
c. Accuracy, Comprehensiveness and Balance, and Justification as 
Enhanced Historical Understanding 
Ultimately, Martin says that “it is reasonable to believe that the 
introduction of interpretations that are more accurate, more comprehensive, 
better balanced, and more justified has enhanced historical 
understanding.”225  All of these individual aspects form to support the more 
nebulous, yet fundamentally undeniable, proposition that we now know 
more about these sodomy laws then we did at the time of Bowers.  This can 
be seen (or what ultimately seems like felt) without necessarily adopting 
one of the two tracks of history presented in this Comment.  And, because 
the work of historians on both sides of this debate have shaped a foundation 
that tells us more about the past then we knew before, then Novick and 
White cannot be entirely right; historical accounts must mean more than 
works of fiction.  Martin proves that something exists between the 
postmodernist wasteland and blind-faith in historical validity. 
 
 225. Id. 
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d. Components of Historical Progress 
When Martin pulls history from the depths of the meaningless, he falls 
short of affording it the ability to declare absolute empirical facts.  He does 
this because, for Martin, interpretational divergence as well as a lack of 
objectivity actually increases understanding for the Historian.226  This idea 
can be traced at least as far as back as Nietzsche, who said: 
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and the 
more affects we are allowed to speak about one thing, the more eyes, 
different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will 
our “concept” of this thing be.  But to eliminate the will altogether, to 
suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this—what 
would that mean but to castrate the intellect?227 
This idea can make sense in the context of what we are looking at, or 
for.  History, as opposed to science,228 will not afford us a forum to test our 
hypothesis.  When one constructs a history, she cannot go back in time and 
ensure that she has everything correct.  But, further distinguishing this 
difference is the idea that history, especially concerning a movement, is a 
matter that might never be fully settled; causal connections are a lot more 
elusive in history then they are in science.  Where science can often be 
boiled down to a logical proof (i.e. an if-then statement), history’s 
causalities do not exist in a vacuum; the strictly if-then ideal cannot be 
evoked because the “ifs” in history are never mutually exclusive.  In short, 
something is usually caused by a multitude of factors revealed to us slowly 
over time. 
When Martin proposes that viewing subsequent histories as divergent is 
not entirely on the mark,229 he conjures Nietzsche’s basic proposition that 
we learn more through different perspectives.  With concern to the 
historical debate over the right to engage in consensual same-sex sodomy, 
subsequent histories have formed interpretive polarities,230 or “traditions of 
interpretation in which, at any given time, the main competition is between 
two schools, or traditions, of interpretation that share the common 
phenomenon.”231  When history evolves to a point of well-policed 
competing ideas, progress has been made.  Indeed “within the context of 
 
 226. Id. at 31. 
 227. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON GENEALOGY OF MORALS 119 (1887)). 
 228. See generally Raymond Martin, The Essential Difference Between History and 
Science, 36 HIST. & THEORY 1 (1997). 
 229. Martin, Progress in Historical Studies, supra note 162, at 28-29. 
 230. Id. at 28. 
 231. Id. 
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controversy among interpretations with the same interpretational focus, 
there can be progress in historical understanding when we achieve greater 
representation and more balance in our understanding of different yet 
relevant, subjective perspectives and agencies, even when this fosters 
interpretational divergence.”232 
But “greater representation and more balance” is not all we get with 
interpretive polarities.  Well-developed history gets us as close to historical 
facts as we can be in the form of agreed-upon facts.233  “[A]t any given 
time, historians who are engaged in an interpretational debate always 
accept a large body of agreed-upon facts, and that at that particular time, in 
that particular context of debate, such agreed-upon facts serve as if they 
were external checks on interpretations.”234  These agreed-upon facts 
contribute to the self-policing that controls and facilitates the growth of 
historical information. 
The histories advocated in Lawrence match up nearly perfectly with 
Martin’s requirements for progress in historical understanding: we now 
have a clearly delineated set of agreed-upon facts; we have two clearly 
defined interpretative polarities; every side of this debate is represented; 
poor and unsupported claims have been questioned and weeded out.  For 
the philosopher or the historian this is a model of how a historical study 
should advance, but for the judiciary looking for the past to dictate an 
objective decision this same model renders history nearly inapplicable. 
2. Applying the Past 
When Cass R. Sunstein argues that “the function of the constitutional 
lawyer, even if historically inclined, is properly and unembarrassingly 
distinctive [from that of the historian],”235 he is clearly correct, but, 
contrary to his position, the distinctiveness of this function arises as a result 
of the very thing that he claims lawyers and the judiciary need not be 
concerned with: certainty in historical understanding.236  With a 
sophisticated and clear understanding of the limitation of history, Sunstein 
 
 232. Id. at 31. 
 233. Id. at 36. 
 234. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 235. Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 602 (1995). 
 236. Id. at 603.  Sunstein argues that the distinction arises in the constitutional lawyers 
purpose of searching for a useable past—“elements in history that can be brought fruitfully 
to bear on current problems”—as opposed to the historian’s goal of “reveal[ing] the closest 
thing to full picture of the past, or to stress the worst aspects of a culture’s legal tradition.”  
Id.  Under Sunstein’s approach the “useable past” does not require “factual” grounding as its 
emphasis is placed on its interpretational effect.  Id. at 602. 
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gets the demands of the historian and the judiciary backwards.  Comparing 
the role of the historian and the lawyer, Rakove writes, 
It may be necessary fiction for lawyers and jurists to believe in a “correct” 
or “true” interpretation of the Constitution, in order to carry on their 
business. Gordon Wood has observed, “but we historian’s have different 
obligations and aims.” The foremost of these tasks is to explain why 
“contrasting meanings” were attached to the Constitution from its 
inception.  And, if anything, this is a task that recent controversies over 
the feasibility of a “jurisprudence of original intention” have inspired 
historians to pursue with relish.237 
If the goal is an explication of contrasting meanings then Martin’s 
framework encourages writing histories without getting bogged down in 
epistemological riddles.  Within the legal framework, however, the elusive 
ideals of “truth” and “correctness” are mandatory.  In the absence of a 
clearly true reliable account, well-developed histories will not give 
answers, but instead supply diverging choices.  Concerning originalist 
matters, it is history that supposedly informs judges on how the law was 
originally understood, and in turn dictates rulings.238  Under this framework 
there is no room for error; the adopted conception of the past becomes the 
law of the present.  Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to demand that the 
past be true. 
The intellectual and emotional appeal of announcing the past to dictate 
the present is obvious but misguided.  As Richard Posner fears, “judges 
fool themselves into thinking that history delivers the solutions to even the 
most difficult and consequential legal issues and thus allows them to duck 
the really difficult questionthe soundness of the solutions as a matter of 
 
 237. RAKOVE, supra note 205, at 10.  
 238. Id.  at 9.  Ravoke writes: 
For the argument that the original meaning, once recovered should be binding 
presents not only a strategy of interpretation but a rule of law.  It insists that 
original meaning should prevail—regardless of intervening revisions, deviations, 
and the judicial doctrine of stare decisis—because the authority of the 
Constitution as supreme law rests on its ratification by the special, popularly 
elected conventions of 1787-88.  The Constitution derives its supremacy; in other 
words, from a direct expression of popular sovereignty, superior in authority to all 
subsequent legal acts resting only on the weaker foundation of representation.  If 
this becomes the premise of interpretation, it follows that the understanding of the 
ratifiers is the preeminent and arguably sole source for reconstructing original 
meaning.  The prior editorial decisions and revisions of the Convention recede to 
the status of mere proposals, while actions taken by any branch of government 
after the constitution took effect themselves become mere interpretations. 
Id. 
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public policy.”239  Still, when we acknowledge what history cannot give us, 
we should not overlook what it can; for while it is not equipped to answer a 
question alone, history is an invaluable tool in guiding judges through the 
more difficult process of finding a just decision.240  Our past is inextricably 
combined with our present.  The notions of justice and fairness we hold as 
a society evolve on a continuum connecting the past and the future.  Just as 
it would be ridiculous to stunt progress because of our (mis)conceptions of 
the rules of yesterday, it would be equally foolish to deny the lessons we 
have learned.  The past will not answer every specific question, but it can 
supply us with a means towards finding the answers.  History should not 
replace our sense of justice, it should inform it. 
Since the past is important, and because historical constructions inform 
us about the past, albeit amorphously, history’s importance remains absent 
the esteem as the sole decisive factor in legal decisions.  But if we allow 
our courts to be informed by history, then they should be obliged to look at 
the past realistically.  As Nietzsche proposed long ago, “the more eyes, 
different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 
concept of this thing be.”241  Here we are viewing the history of American 
sodomy laws from two unabashedly subjective perspectives.  And under 
this model this should tell us more about the past in the most general sense.  
For the philosophers and historians this might be enough, but in our courts 
more eyes only means more choices shrouded in facts. 
I am certain that many readers will believe one of the perspectives 
offered here is more truthful than the other, but in many cases this belief 
will have little to do with history, but instead with an inner sense of right 
and wrong.  Simply put, it is nearly impossible to adopt as fact one of two 
conflicting versions of the past when they are both grounded in truth.  
Should we allow Justices to hide their subjective decisions behind this 
choice in announcing or denying constitutional rights?  I argue no.  We 
must acknowledge the tiebreaker that exists already; our sense of justice. 
History is persuasive and uniquely illuminating.  Through self-policing 
in the manner Flaherty proposes, better or more important works will have 
more impact than less qualified ones, and progress will continue in all of 
our ongoing historical debates.  But, if our only goal is to flesh out ideas, 
then history can carry no more weight than new and insightful 
philosophical perspectives, and what is considered a good historical 
account might depend more on the idea it presents, than how it supports it.  
 
 239. Posner, supra note 71, at 583. 
 240. Id. at 589. 
 241. NIETZSCHE, supra note  227, at 119. 
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Maybe this is all history is really equipped to give us.  Maybe it should not 
carry any more weight than persuasive philosophies.  But this idea seems to 
shortchange the unique value inherent in gaining a better understanding of 
our past.  Still, at the end of the day, after the Supreme Court exhibited a 
willingness to manipulate history in Bowers, it is hard to decide where 
history should stand.  Intuitively, it seems to offer more than other 
interpretive and/or rhetorical tools, but it also undeniably allows our courts 
to disguise an agenda in “facts.”  Perhaps in taking advantage of this, the 
Court has manipulated the value out of our greatest natural resource—our 
own past. 
CONCLUSION 
In subsuming consensual same-sex sodomy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Right to Privacy, the Lawrence Court’s decision did not rely 
on history, but instead, ultimately, on the Court’s notion of justice.  
Although it is easy to see what history the majority would have adopted, it 
is hard to say what decision history actually dictated.  It is uncomfortable 
for a lot of people, myself included, to rely on the Court’s notion of justice 
to dictate our fundamental rights.  Yet, an honest look at the composition of 
history acknowledges that in history-based legal decisions this is precisely 
what we do. 
It is my hope that ongoing debates about this case center on whether a 
just decision was reachednot an historically sound onebecause 
ultimately this is the only question that matters.  In conclusion, Scalia’s 
words on original understanding bare significance on the more general 
application of legal history.  He says that  
the difficulties and uncertainties of determining original meaning and 
applying it to modern circumstances are negligible compared with the 
difficulties and uncertainties of the philosophy which says that the 
Constitution changes, that the very act which it once prohibited it now 
permits, and which it once permitted it now forbids; and that the key to 
that change is unknown and unknowable.242   
In this Comment I have attempted to show how reliance on history as a 
legally decisive entity allows for an agenda to be shrouded in facts.  This 
risk is far graver than the “difficulties and uncertainties” of a living 
Constitution, where subjective agendas will certainly play a role, but at 
least then the risk will be a transparent one. 
 
 
 242. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 45-46 (1998) (emphasis added). 
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